Visions of rationality by Chase, V. et al.
Humans and animals alike make inductive inferences.
Firefighters predict how fires will progress from cues such as
smoke and roof ‘sponginess’1, while peahens use the elabo-
rateness of peacocks’ tails to infer their fitness before decid-
ing whether to mate with them2. The cues on which organ-
isms base their inductive inferences are typically uncertain:
the old adage aside, sometimes there’s no smoke even where
there’s fire.
How do people make inferences, and are their infer-
ences rational? Most researchers of inference share a vision
of rationality whose roots trace back to the Enlightenment.
This now classical view holds that the laws of human infer-
ence are equivalent to the laws of probability and logic. For
French astronomer Pierre Laplace, for example, probability
theory embodied human intuition: ‘The theory of prob-
ability is at bottom nothing more than good sense reduced
to a calculus’3. Nineteenth-century German philosopher
Theodor Lipps wrote that logic ‘is nothing if not the physics
of thought’4. So fundamental was the belief that the mind
worked by the rules of probability and logic that when
human intuition was observed to deviate from them, the
rules themselves were revised5. In short, many pre-20th-
century thinkers believed that the psychological defines the
rational.
Variants of the classical view have flourished in 20th-
century psychology. Many researchers maintain the belief
that the laws of probability theory and logic at least approxi-
mately describe human inference. In the view of Cameron
Peterson and Lee Beach, for example: ‘Probability theory
and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological mod-
els that integrate and account for human performance in a
wide range of inferential tasks’6. According to Jean Piaget,
cognitive development culminates in a set of logico-mathe-
matical abilities that essentially reflect the laws of probabil-
ity and logic. More recently, Lance Rips has argued for the
existence of ‘mental logic’7 . Finally, rational-choice theo-
rists and economists often model people’s decisions using
probability theory as an approximation (e.g. Refs 8,9).
Unlike their Enlightenment predecessors, however, these
modern researchers see classical models as norms against
which human reasoning can be evaluated rather than as
codifications of it: when the two diverge, it is concluded
that there is something wrong with the reasoning, not with
the norms.
In the past 25 years, the idea that human inference can
be either defined or described by probability theory and
logic has been increasingly challenged. Proponents of the
heuristics-and-biases program have argued that inference is
systematically biased and error-prone, powered by quick
and dirty cognitive heuristics10. Numerous departures from
classical norms in inductive reasoning – ‘cognitive illusions’,
such as overconfidence, base-rate neglect, and the conjunc-
tion fallacy (all discussed in more detail later) – have been
attributed to application of these heuristics. A parallel re-
search program has been devoted to accounting for departures
of deductive inference from logical norms (for a review of
this literature, see Ref. 11).
As the heuristics-and-biases program grew, the view
that human reasoning is fundamentally irrational sup-
planted the belief that it accords with classical rational
norms within and outside psychology12. In the words of
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein: ‘It appears that people
lack the correct programs for many important judgmental
tasks.... it may be argued that we have not had the opportu-
nity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually
with uncertainty’13. The conjunction fallacy (see section
below on Social Rationality) impelled paleontologist
Stephen Jay Gould to speculate: ‘Our minds are not built
(for whatever reason) to work by the rules of probability’14.
Some have even argued that deviations from rational norms
‘should be considered the rule rather than the exception’15.
Are violations of rational norms really the rule? Given
the analogy between inference and perception behind the il-
lusion metaphor10, they should be considered an exception.
Just as vision researchers construct situations in which the
functioning of the visual system leads to incorrect inferences
about the world (e.g. about line lengths in the Müller-Lyer
illusion), researchers in the heuristics-and-biases program
select problems in which reasoning by cognitive heuristics
leads to violations of probability theory12. However, the
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conclusions they draw from such unrepresentative designs
often differ sharply from those drawn by researchers of per-
ception. Vision scientists do not conclude from the robust-
ness of the Müller-Lyer illusion, for instance, that people
are generally poor at inferring object lengths. However,
many advocates of the heuristics-and-biases program con-
clude from the cognitive illusions found in laboratory tasks
that human judgment is subject to severe and systematic 
biases that compromise its general functioning16,17.
How does judgment look when one does not select
problems systematically? The use of representative design,
which entails simulating real-world conditions of interest in
order to test and evaluate human performance18–20, casts
new light on inference. For instance, studies have shown
that when people are tested on a representative sample of
general knowledge questions, the overconfidence bias found
in selected samples of questions disappears (e.g. Refs 21–23;
but see also Ref. 24). In a recent meta-analysis of confidence
judgments in more than 40 general knowledge tasks, Peter
Juslin and colleagues25 found an average overconfidence of
practically zero). In addition, people’s estimates of the fre-
quency with which letters of the alphabet appear in various
positions within words are better calibrated when partici-
pants judge a large, representative sample of letters26 rather
than a small, selected sample27. While systematic design,
such as that employed in the heuristics-and-biases program,
is often desirable when we want to decide between cognitive
models, only representative design allows us to evaluate the
quality of human judgment in the real world.
Problems with the classical definition of rationality
Despite their disagreements, proponents of the neo-
Enlightenment view and the heuristics-and-biases view
agree on one critical point: rationality requires reasoning in
accordance with the rules of probability theory. Even if we
provisionally accept this definition of rationality (which we
will challenge shortly), we still see three major problems
with it. First, no single conception of probability is shared
by all statisticians and philosophers. The applicability of the
rules of probability theory to unique events is hotly dis-
puted, with some contending that they apply to unique
events and others arguing that they apply only to classes of
events28. For someone who interprets probability in the 
latter, strictly frequentistic sense, these rules are irrelevant 
to the many tasks involving unique events studied in the
heuristics-and-biases program. In our view, wherever a
norm’s applicability depends on our interpretation of prob-
ability in this way, we are not justified in treating it as 
an unequivocal norm of sound reasoning (Refs 29,30; for a
recent debate on this point, see Refs 31,32).
The second problem with the classical definition of 
rationality is its blindness to content and context. In much
research on inference, the rules of probability are taken a
priori as normative, and content is only later filled in. In other
words, rather than following the practices of good statisticians,
who tailor statistical models to suit specific problems, those
who subscribe to this definition of rationality sometimes fail
to analyse problem content and people’s assumptions about
it. Unless this is done, we cannot interpret their judgments.
In studies of Bayesian inference, for example, participants
might make intelligent assumptions that render some of the
given information irrelevant to their judgments, which can
be mistaken for neglect of base-rate information33.
The third and most serious problem we see with the
classical definition of rationality is that, beyond the simple
problems used in most research, it makes unrealistic de-
mands of the mind. In the real world, matters are more
complicated than the simple content-blind norms tested in
most laboratory problems assume. Here, Bayes’ theorem
and subjective expected-utility maximization often become
mathematically complex and computationally intractable.
Moreover, in many situations, a rational model cannot even
be specified because the problem space is unbounded (see
Refs 34 Appendix, 35). Expecting people’s inferences to 
conform to classical rational norms in such complex en-
vironments requires believing that the human mind is a
‘Laplacean demon’36: a supercalculator with unlimited time,
knowledge, and computational power.
Is there any view between the two extremes we have so
far considered, namely, that the mind is an omniscient, om-
nipotent Laplacean demon or that it simply ‘lacks the cor-
rect programs’13 for making many important judgments?
Herbert Simon set the stage for what we consider the most
promising alternative: ‘Human rational behavior… is shaped
by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task en-
vironments and the computational capabilities of the actor’37.
In other words, rationality cannot be defined except by 
reference to environmental and cognitive constraints.
Moreover, rationality is a tool for helping organisms to
reach their real-world goals, not necessarily to conform to
rational norms. In Simon’s own words: ‘Reason is… a gun
for hire that can be employed in any goals we have’38. In the
remainder of this review, we describe how recent researchers
have used Simon’s scissors analogy to fashion a new area of
research on human inference.
Bounded rationality
The human mind has to solve important and complex
problems – such as deciding whom to marry – under condi-
tions of limited time, knowledge, and computational capac-
ity. Consider Charles Darwin, who methodically listed the
pros and cons of marriage and bachelorhood before decid-
ing to marry Emma Wedgewood. Despite his willingness to
take such an analytic approach to deciding affairs of the
heart, Darwin could not have hoped to make this decision
rationally in any classical sense. Suppose that he had 
attempted to maximize his subjective expected utility.
While he deliberated about whether marrying was the right
choice, listing each of the infinite conceivable consequences
of marrying and not marrying, assigning probabilities to
each, and searching for more information about his pros-
pective wives, they would all most likely have married other
men (not to mention had children and died). Even if they
were infinitely patient, he would still need an infinite num-
ber of supercomputers to integrate all of this information
for him.
What does Darwin’s dilemma illustrate? First, life’s im-
portant problems cannot necessarily be solved by optimiz-
ation because the space of possibilities that must be taken
into account is often unlimited. Second, even when this
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space is limited and knowledge is complete, optimization is
often impossible to achieve in any real system owing to the
computational demands it poses; after all, even Gary
Kasparov’s arch rival Deep Blue is unable to optimize its
moves fully in the well-defined problem space of chess.
Simon proposed that, because of the above constraints,
human inference in the real world exhibits ‘bounded 
rationality’ rather than the classical rationality assumed by
optimal models in psychology, economics, and biology (for
a relevant debate, see Refs 35,39). The key feature of
bounded rationality is limited information search, which 
requires some kind of stopping rule. Note that here search
can refer either to search for alternatives (e.g. mates), or
search for each alternative’s values on particular cues (e.g. a
potential mate’s age, sense of humor, etc.). We now de-
scribe various interpretations of bounded rationality, saving
the one we favor until last40.
Some researchers in psychology and economics define
bounded rationality as constrained optimization, that is,
optimizing relative to a criterion while taking the costs of
time, information search, and computation into account
(e.g. Refs 34,41–43). This stopping rule – to terminate search
when its costs outweigh its benefits – is deceptively simple.
In fact, the optimization is simply shifted to the problem of
determining when to terminate search, which means that
this brand of bounded rationality is saddled with the very
intractability that it is intended to eliminate44. Unsurprisingly,
most economists have not embraced bounded rationality 
in this form because they ‘are in the market for methods for
reducing the number of parameters to explain data, and a
reduction is not what bounded rationality promises’42.
The most prominent approach of this type, ‘rational
analysis’34,41, is predicated on the assumptions that human
cognition is adaptive and that adaptation amounts to opti-
mization. It entails specifying the goals of the cognitive sys-
tem, developing a formal model of the environment, and
deriving the optimal behavioral function based on the goals,
formal model, and minimal cognitive constraints. This
function is then compared to human performance, and the
model duly refined to bring the two into closer correspon-
dence. The cognitive constraints that rational analysis takes
into account include deliberation costs and short-term
memory limitations. Rational heuristics can conserve cog-
nitive resources by exploiting environmental regularities
(e.g. the rarity of most cues and target variables; see Refs
45,46) to simplify the task of optimization.
The rational analysis approach has made impressive
progress in developing ecologically appropriate norms to
which one can compare human performance in memory,
categorization, hypothesis testing and causal inference34,41,45.
Furthermore, it has demonstrated that some of the most 
robust findings in cognitive psychology (e.g. power-law
learning) can be illuminated by ecological analysis. Still, 
this approach has important limitations. First, it can be per-
formed only in situations in which an optimal solution can
be worked out. Second, devising a computationally tractable
rational model requires making vastly simplifying assump-
tions about the real-world environment (e.g. assuming that
cues are independent to trim down Bayesian computations;
Refs 34,41). Moreover, because rational analysis starts with
a full-blown optimal model made up of mathematical
rather than psychological components, it is not well suited
to building plausible models of human cognitive
processes35. As John R. Anderson, who spearheaded rational
analysis, has himself observed: ‘It is in the spirit of a rational
analysis to prescribe what the behavior of a system should be
rather than how to compute it’41.
Some have suggested that the cognitive heuristics iden-
tified in the heuristics-and-biases program, such as represen-
tativeness and availability, exhibit bounded rationality10,13,47.
Early research on cognitive heuristics certainly served to
demonstrate that human inference does not always conform
to classical rational norms. It also encouraged researchers to
explore the hypothesis that people rely on cognitive heuristics
made up of simple psychological processes rather than formal
procedures in order to make inferences. However, to date,
the cognitive heuristics posited in this literature have not been
formalized such that one could either simulate or analyse
mathematically their behavior (for a counter-example, see
Ref. 48), thus leaving them free to account for all kinds of
performance post hoc (for a rebuttal of this point, see Ref.
31). Furthermore, it has not been specified whether or how
such heuristics capitalize on environmental structure to make
inferences, which is central to Simon’s original conception
of bounded rationality.
We now describe some models of bounded rationality
that capture both the environmental and the cognitive
blades of Simon’s scissors. Their most critical feature is that
they include smart, simple rules for stopping information
search. We refer to heuristics based on limited (cue) search
as ‘fast and frugal’40.
Fast and frugal heuristics
Which has the larger population: San Diego or San
Antonio? If you are not American, you will probably guess
San Diego. Why? Because you have heard of it, and the
chances are that you have never heard of San Antonio. If
you are American, however, you probably recognize both
cities, and thus cannot rely on the ‘recognition heuristic’ to
make your choice40. In this context, the recognition heuristic
can be summarized in one sentence: if you recognize one
object and not the other, then infer that the recognized ob-
ject has the higher value on the target variable; if you do not
recognize either object, then guess.
What happens if you recognize both cities? In that case,
you have to retrieve information from memory to make an
inference. ‘Take The Best’ is a fast and frugal heuristic for
using this information49. Imagine that we have a set of ob-
jects, all German cities with more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants, and a target variable, population size. Each city can be
characterized on a number of binary (or dichtomized) cues,
each of which predicts population size to varying degrees.
For instance, cities with major-league soccer teams tend to
be larger. In Take The Best, the objects are compared on the
most valid cue, the second most valid cue, and so on until a
cue on which the objects differ is found (see Fig. 1). All that
Take The Best needs to learn – or to estimate – is the rank
order of cues by validity. Moreover, its stopping rule for in-
formation search is very simple: take the best cue (i.e. the
most valid one that discriminates) and ignore the rest. The
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first step of Take The Best is always the recognition heuristic,
which enables it to exploit ignorance to make smart infer-
ences. (The recognition heuristic could be the first step of
other inference strategies as well; see Ref 37.)
Using the recognition heuristic might be smart, but do
people actually use it? Empirical results suggest that they do.
In one study, American students were asked to make hun-
dreds of inferences about which member of pairs of German
cities (e.g. Bielefeld or Munich) was larger. In over 90% of
the choices in which recognition discriminated between 
alternatives, participants in this study opted for the recog-
nized city40. Clearly, a person who recognizes all objects
cannot use the recognition heuristic (which in the German
city environment generally discriminated well between
larger and smaller cities, for this American sample). A
counter-intuitive implication of this is that someone with
less knowledge can actually make more accurate inferences
under some conditions, a prediction supported by empirical
results (the ‘less-is-more effect’; Refs 40,49).
When inferring target variables as diverse as population
sizes and high-school drop-out rates, computer simulation re-
sults show that Take The Best roughly matches or outperforms
in inferential accuracy a number of linear models that inte-
grate across all cues, such as multiple regression and a unit-
weighted linear model called ‘Dawes’ rule’. Even more surpris-
ingly, the ‘Minimalist’ heuristic, a poor cousin of Take The
Best that selects cues in random order, also fares well relative
to these computationally more expensive algorithms. Take The
Best thrives particularly well compared with integration al-
gorithms when generalizations have to be made (i.e. when test
set ! training set) rather than when data have to be fitted (i.e.
when test set = training set). This is because algorithms that
integrate all available information, such as multiple regression,
tend to suffer from overfitting, whereas Take The Best relies
disproportionately on cues that exhibit greater invariance, at
least in the data environments in which it has been tested so far.
Table 1 shows the results of a simulated competition
(excluding the recognition heuristic) between Take The
Best, Minimalist, Dawes’ rule, and multiple regression in
which the target variable was rates of homelessness in 50 
US cities. The left column indicates the average number of
cues that each algorithm had to look up (out of a total 
possible of six), which was roughly the same in both types of
competition. The center and right columns show the per-
centages of correct binary inferences each algorithm made
when the test set was equal to and not equal to the training
set, respectively.
Take The Best and Minimalist are clearly more frugal in
their use of information than the two integration algorithms,
yet are about as accurate as the others. Even more remarkably,
Take The Best actually outperforms multiple regression
when generalization is required.
Ecological rationality
Fast and frugal heuristics can perform about as well as algo-
rithms that require much more information, and in a serial
architecture, more time. What is their secret? The answer
lies in their ‘ecological rationality’. Such heuristics capitalize
on environmental regularities to make smart inferences. For
instance, the recognition heuristic exploits the fact that our
ignorance is often systematically related to variables that we
want to infer (for example, we are more likely to recognize
big cities, companies, and universities than small ones).
Mathematical analysis can help us to understand where
and why Take The Best can (or cannot) be more accurate
than a weighted linear model in which the weights are the
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Fig. 1 Flow diagram of a fast and frugal heuristic: Take The
Best. (©1996, American Psychological Association; modified,
with permission, from Ref. 49.)
Table 1. Inferring homelessness: a competition between algorithmsa
Algorithm Average number of Percent correct binary inferences
cues looked up Test set the same Test set different
as training set from training set
Minimalist 2.1 61 56
Take The Best 2.4 69 63
Dawes’ rule 6 66 58
Multiple regression 6 70 61
aModified from Ref. 50.
correlations between cues and the target variable40,51. The
set of non-redundant binary cues in any environment is 
finite. Where known cues are abundant (i.e. their number
approaches this finite maximum), weighted linear models
tend to be more accurate (and their accuracy approaches
100%), whereas where known cues are scarce (i.e. their
number is small relative to log2N, where N is the total num-
ber of objects), Take The Best is on average more accurate.
In addition, when the weights are non-compensatory; that
is, the weight of each cue exceeds the weights of all those
below it in the cue order, the faster and more frugal Take
The Best cannot be surpassed by any weighted linear model.
Because the information available in the environment
(and in the organism’s memory) is often scarce, Take The Best
might do well in a wide range of real-world situations. How-
ever, no single heuristic can make good decisions in every
environment because ecological rationality necessarily implies
specificity. The more ecological assumptions are built into a
heuristic, the less well it will generalize to environments in
which those assumptions are not met. Thus, the mind’s
‘adaptive toolbox’ most likely includes a panoply of heuristics
suited for use in different situations52–54. As candidate tools,
we and our colleagues have developed fast and frugal heuristics
for a variety of problems40, including categorization (see also
Ref. 55), mate choice, and quantitative estimation.
In natural environments, information comes in some
forms and not others. Ecologically rational heuristics not
only take specific environmental structures for granted, but
are tuned to work on specific information representations.
Unlike probability theory, real systems – whether computers
or brains – are not indifferent to how numerical information
is represented. For instance, a pocket calculator has an algo-
rithm for multiplication. However, because it is designed to
work on numbers entered in base 10 rather than base 2, it
would appear to have no algorithm for multiplication at all
if one gave it binary numbers as input56.
To what representations of numerical information
might our cognitive algorithms be tuned? The problems
typically used in research on inductive inference express 
information in terms of probabilities or percentages, which
are historically a very recent invention. They would not
have been encountered in any form in the environments of
our evolutionary ancestors, nor can they be directly experi-
enced today, notwithstanding their ubiquity in the media.
A more naturalistic way to represent numerical information
is in natural frequencies: absolute frequencies that have not
been normalized with respect to the base rates (see Box 1).
From these considerations we can predict that our cognitive
algorithms are more probably designed to reason about nu-
merical information in the form of natural frequencies
rather than probabilities.
One of the key findings of the heuristics-and-biases
program is that people overweight new data relative to base
rates in judging posterior probabilities in Bayesian inference
problems (e.g. the probability that a person who tests positive
for HIV really has it), which is generally referred to as ‘base-
rate neglect’10. Some of these results may be attributable to
the fact that the Bayesian model taken as normative ignores
relevant aspects of content or context33,61. Still, there are
problems in which the Bayesian answer seems appropriate
and yet to which people give decidedly non-Bayesian re-
sponses. How well would people solve these problems if the
information were presented in terms of natural frequencies
rather than probabilities? As it turns out, they look much
more like Bayesians (see Box 1 and Ref. 58). The reason
seems to be computational simplicity: whereas plugging the
necessary probabilities into Bayes’ theorem requires several
steps of multiplication and division, computing posterior
probabilities from natural frequencies boils down to simply
dividing the number of hits (e.g. people who test positive
and really have HIV) by the sum of hits and false alarms
(e.g. all people who test positive). In other words, the 
frequency representation does part of the work for us.
Teaching people to convert probabilities into natural
frequencies has been shown to be a powerful tool for train-
ing students in Bayesian reasoning59. Natural frequency rep-
resentations also help experts, such as physicians, to make
diagnostic inferences60 and have immediate applications in
other contexts, for instance, in helping AIDS counselors
and their patients interpret HIV test results61.
Social rationality
So far we have characterized Simon’s ecological blade strictly
in terms of the physical environment, but it reflects the 
social environment (the world of other organisms) as well.
We begin our discussion of ‘social rationality’ by describing
some situations in which adhering to social norms is rational
although it conflicts with internal consistency, which is often
seen as the defining feature of rational choice in decision
theory and behavioral economics.
In real-world social contexts, consistency in choice is
not always in one’s best interest. In competitive situations,
it is sometimes desirable to exhibit adaptively unpredictable,
or protean, behavior, so that other people and animals can-
not predict what one will do62,63. For example, our chances
of winning a tennis match would be compromised if our
opponent knew a stable, consistent order in which we chose
to serve to the left or the right during a match. Similarly,
when being pursued by a predator that might be able to 
outrun it, a prey animal would be unwise to flee along a
straight, predictable path, even if not doing so means taking
longer to cover the same distance62.
One of the basic principles of internal consistency in
choice is known as ‘Property "’. Informally speaking, it re-
quires that if you choose A over B, you should do so inde-
pendently of the other alternatives in the choice set. At first
blush, one might believe that all violations of Property " are
irrational. However, our social values and goals sometimes
conflict with this principle. Imagine, for example, that you
are at a dinner party. At dessert, it looks as if there are fewer
pastries than there are guests. By the time the dessert tray
gets to you, there is only one pastry left, a chocolate eclair.
If you know that another of the guests has not yet taken a
dessert, out of politeness you might choose to have nothing
over having the eclair. However, if the host were to replen-
ish the pastry supply, you might well choose to eat that
same eclair over having nothing. In other words, after
choosing B (nothing) over A (the eclair), you might choose
A over B just because other items were added to the choice
set.
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We have probably all violated Property " in similar 
situations. Does this make us irrational? Not if we take the
social environment into account64: being polite pays off.
Not being so could anger others and lessen the chances 
that other people will cooperate with us in the future. Thus,
for many of us, violating the social rule ‘don’t take the last
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Consider the way in which information is represented in the
following Bayesian inference problem (adapted from Ref. a):
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a woman at age
40 who participates in routine screening. If a woman has
breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will have a
positive mammography. If a woman does not have breast
cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she will also have a
positive mammography.
A woman in this age group had a positive mammography
in a routine screening. What is the probability that she
actually has breast cancer? (Answer: ____%)
Inserting the given numbers into Bayes’ thereom (see Fig.)
gives a posterior probability, p(cancer|positive), of 7.8%. However,
95 out of 100 physicians who solved this problem estimated the
probability to be between 70% and 80% (Ref. a), an order of
magnitude greater than that given by Bayes’ theorem. This is a
gross error, one that in a real medical context could have serious
consequences for patients’ well being (at least until a biopsy can
be performed). This apparent example of base-rate neglect
seems to justify the dire conclusions about human rationality
drawn in the heuristics-and-biases program.
However, notice that the mammography problem above is 
presented in terms of single-event probabilities (e.g. that a par-
ticular woman has breast cancer). Human cognitive algorithms
for this type of inference, if they exist, are most likely to be 
designed to operate on numerical information in the form in which
humans have gathered it over evolutionary history – natural fre-
quencies; that is, absolute frequencies that have not been nor-
malized with respect to the base rates. Here is how the mammog-
raphy problem looks when expressed in natural frequencies:
Ten out of every 1000 women at age 40 who participate
in routine screening have breast cancer. Eight out of
these ten women with breast cancer will get a positive
mammography. Of the 990 women without breast 
cancer, 95 will also get a positive mammography.
Here is a new representative sample of women at age 40
who got a positive mammography in routine screening.
How many of these women do you expect actually to
have breast cancer? (Answer: ____ out of ____)
When students who had never heard of Bayesian inference
were given problems like this one, they responded like
Bayesians in 46% of problems, whereas stu-
dents who received them in probabilities
solved only 16% correctlyb. Among physi-
cians with an average of 14 years profes-
sional experience, the benefit of frequency
information was equally strong (again 46%
made Bayesian responses compared with
10% given probabilitiesc). In a less complex
medical decision-making problem, the per-
centage of Bayesian solutions found with
frequencies rose to 76% (Ref. d).
Why should people reason so much 
better when given frequencies rather than
probabilities? Imagine two people trying to
solve the mammography problem (see Fig.).
While the person on the left struggles to
combine the probabilities according to Bayes’
theorem, the person on the right simply has
to divide the number of hits (women with
cancer and positive mammography) by the
total number of hits and false alarms (all
women with positive mammography). Thus,
instead of taking in frequency information,
converting it to probabilities, and plugging
them into Bayes’ theorem, the mind can
simply tally the frequencies and perform a
simpler computation. This is an example 
of how cognitive algorithms make the en-
vironment do some of the work for them:
natural frequencies carry base-rate information without explicitly
representing it.
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Fig. Differential complexity of Bayesian computations based on probabil-
ities (left) and natural frequencies (right). (see text for explanation.) (©1995,
American Psychological Association; modified, with permission, from Ref. b.)
piece of cake’ carries higher costs than violating Property 
", which, after all, will only offend a handful of decision
theorists and economists. Of course, we can always account
for this example of inconsistency by arguing that the nature
of the eclair changed with the change in the choice set; 
that is, it ceased to be the last dessert. But the point here
is that if we allow the meeting of social expectations into our
definition of rationality, then we can predict such choices
rather than having to explain them post hoc.
Another context in which being socially rational re-
quires deviating from a content-blind norm is in the famous
‘Linda problem’. In this problem participants read: ‘Linda 
is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright… As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimi-
nation and social justice…’ They are then asked to choose
which hypothesis is more ‘probable’: that Linda is a bank
teller (T) or that Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement (T#F). In most studies, 80–90% of
participants rank T#F as more probable than T (Ref. 65).
This effect – known as the conjunction fallacy – is widely
interpreted as a violation of the conjunction rule, according
to which the probability of a conjoint event cannot exceed
the probability of any of its constituents.
In the Linda problem, participants have to infer what
the experimenter means by ‘probable,’ a term that in natural
language has multiple, related meanings, most of which
cannot be reduced to mathematical probability (e.g. ‘plau-
sible’ or ‘conceivable’). Which of these meanings do they
infer? One possible answer can be derived from Paul Grice’s
theory66 of conversational reasoning, which holds that it 
is reasonable for the audience (participant) to assume that
the communicator (experimenter) will follow certain social
rules governing communication. If they assume that the
‘relevance maxim’, by which the audience expects the 
communicator’s contribution to be relevant to the conver-
sation, applies in the Linda problem, participants should
infer that ‘probable’ does not refer to mathematical prob-
ability, because a mathematical interpretation would render
the description of Linda irrelevant to the requested 
judgment67.
Based on this analysis, one can construct a social 
context in which people following the relevance maxim 
are more likely to infer a mathematical meaning. If, im-
mediately before the probability judgment, participants are
asked for a judgment that renders Linda’s description 
relevant – such as a typicality judgment (i.e. ‘How good an
example of a bank teller is Linda?’) – then adherence to the
conjunction rule should increase. Indeed, this is what
Hertwig observed68: among participants asked to make a
typicality judgment first, the percentage following the 
conjunction rule was on average 40 percentage points
higher than that among participants who made the prob-
ability judgment immediately. It has also been shown that
asking participants to estimate frequencies in conjunction
problems (e.g. ‘How many people like Linda are bank
tellers?’) dramatically increases the percentage of judgments
consistent with the conjunction rule65,69, perhaps because
the frequency representation eschews the ambiguity of the
term ‘probable’68. Conversational analysis has revealed still
other relevance-preserving inferences drawn in the Linda
problem that lead participants to violate the conjunction
rule (e.g. Ref. 70).
Such re-analyses of apparent cognitive biases highlight
the hazards of confusing with irrationality the human 
ability to make intelligent semantic and pragmatic infer-
ences71. Many researchers are pushing the limits of our
knowledge about social rationality in still other ways by
studying, for instance, how people reason about deontic
conditionals (relating to duty or obligation) and social 
contracts53,72–74, and how emotions, traditionally thought 
to undermine reason, might actually help people to think
and decide rationally75,76. This research demonstrates that
social values and goals deserve a place in both cognitive 
explanations and definitions of rationality.
Conclusion
We began by challenging the classical vision of human 
rationality as adherence to the norms of probability 
theory and logic. Not only are these norms inherently 
problematic when applied without regard to content 
and context, but they fail to capture what it means to be 
rational either in ancestral environments or in the modern
world. The mind has evolved to tackle important adap-
tive problems, not to solve mathematical brain-teasers. 
We argue that to discover how the mind works, and how
well, we need to understand how the mind functions 
under its own constraints – its bounded rationality – and
how it exploits the structure of the social and physical 
environments in which it must reach its goals – its eco-
logical rationality. By adding these perspectives to our 
theoretical scope, we broaden and deepen our vision of 
rationality.
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Outstanding questions
• It has been proposed that the mind has an ‘adapative toolbox’ of
specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems52–54. 
What heuristics are in the adaptive toolbox? What environmental cues
might determine whether one heuristic is triggered as opposed to
another?
• What are the structures of the environments in which specific heuristics
perform well or badly, and why? To what extent are people sensitive to
these structures and in what terms can we describe them?
• The recognition heuristic relies on recognition memory, which develops
early ontogenetically and arose early phylogenetically. What other
fundamental psychological abilities might serve as building blocks for
fast and frugal heuristics?
• What criteria other than accuracy (e.g. speed, computational complexity)
are relevant to evaluating the performance of different heuristics? How
well do fast and frugal heuristics fare relative to optimal ones by these
criteria? Which heuristics come closest to mimicking human performance
on these various measures?
• What role do emotions and culture play in bounded rationality? How
might specific emotions, such as love and disgust, help people to make
adaptive decisions (e.g. by stopping information search)? Does following
social norms provide a fast and frugal way to bypass deliberation by the
individual?
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Review
The power of stereopsis in generating percepts of three-
dimensional (3-D) structure is now so familiar that it has
become a staple of our entertainment diet. It is difficult not
to marvel at the transformation of flat, two-dimensional im-
ages into a full 3-D percept that causes objects to ‘jump off’
the page. This review describes some recent results that re-
veal the potency of stereovision in shaping our perception of
the world, and sketches some general theoretical insights
about visual processing that have been gained from this field
of research.
To understand the computational problem the visual
system must solve in stereopsis, consider how images are
generated when natural scenes are viewed binocularly. Vision
depends on how light is reflected onto our two retinal 
surfaces from external surfaces in 3-D space. Surfaces can
vary in reflectance, depth, and transmittance, all of which
can affect the way that images are formed on the two 
retinae. One natural way to think about vision is as a reverse
image formation process: given a series of images, what are
their most likely causes? To answer this question in stereo-
vision, the visual system must infer the transformations that
relate the images in the two eyes, and recover the infor-
mation that these transformations provide about the three-
dimensional world.
Historically, the informational basis of stereopsis was
thought to be specified by the pattern of binocular ‘dispar-
ities’ computed from the two images1–11. Disparity refers to
the difference in the visual direction of two or more points
in space. When two points are situated at different depths
from the observer, their angular separation will be different
in the two eyes. The difference between these separations is
the disparity (or relative disparity) of image features, which
can be used to infer their depth. In order to compute dis-
parity, the visual system must have some means of solving
the correspondence problem, that is, of determining which
features in the two eyes correspond to a common surface
feature in the 3-D world. Until recently, it was thought that
the problem of stereovision was solved once correspondence
was determined and disparity was computed. For this rea-
son, virtually all of the theoretical work in stereovision over
the past few decades has focused on developing solutions to






One of the most powerful sources of information about three-dimensional (3-D)
structure is provided by stereovision (or stereopsis). For over a century, theoretical and
empirical investigations into this ability have focused on the role of binocular disparity
in generating percepts of 3-D structure. Recent work in image segmentation
demonstrates that stereovision can cause large changes in perceptual organization that
cannot be understood on the basis of binocular disparity alone. It is argued that these
phenomena reveal the need for theoretical tools beyond those that have dominated
the study of visual perception over the past three decades.
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